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Abstract 
 
Tacit knowledge in requirements documents can lead 
to miscommunication between software engineers and 
other stakeholders. One way in which the presence of 
tacit knowledge is signalled in text is by linguistic 
presuppositions. In this paper, we present a brief 
introduction to tacit knowledge, presuppositions and the 
links between them. Our aim is to build a theoretically 
grounded system which is able to automatically highlight 
all the presuppositions that might have a negative impact 
on communication through requirements documents. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Tacit knowledge can be seen as knowledge not yet put 
into words. Similarly, the presuppositions of a sentence 
are assumptions that the author or speaker takes for 
granted and they are signalled by specific types of 
syntactic structure. In requirements documents, tacit 
knowledge can lead to miscommunication between 
software engineers and other stakeholders. One way in 
which the presence of tacit knowledge can be discovered 
in text is through presuppositions. For instance, a 
requirement “Radiation dose expected is less than 1 krad 
and 1010n/cm2” commits the reader to the radiation dose 
being expressible in krad and n/cm2. Tracking such 
implicit commitments in requirements documents, and 
identifying which of those are not made explicit, can 
reveal elements of tacit knowledge.  
 
In this paper, we describe the results of our preliminary 
investigation into observing and analyzing the presence, 
characteristics and potential impact of presuppositions. 
We propose to build a systematic method for making 
presuppositions explicit in requirements documents in 
order to avoid misunderstanding and misinterpretation 
when communicating requirements. The paper provides a 
short review of tacit knowledge and presuppositions, and 
then summarizes our observation of presuppositions in 
requirements. 
 
2. Tacit Knowledge 
Polanyi characterizes tacit knowledge as “knowing 
more than one can tell” [1]. This way, however, tacit 
knowledge is defined purely and exclusively in terms of 
“tacitness”, which means, in contrast with explicit 
knowledge, that tacit knowledge cannot be articulated at 
all, and therefore cannot be used or managed by human 
beings [2]. Gourley [3] credits Janik [4] with the proposal 
that the term “tacit knowledge” can be used at two 
different levels: firstly, following the Polanyi’s view, tacit 
knowledge is knowledge inexpressible in words, and 
acquired by familiarity or practice (such as smells and 
sounds). Secondly, tacit knowledge at a shallow level is 
knowledge not yet put into words such as craft 
knowledge and presuppositions. Although there are other 
ways to define dimensions and hierarchies of tacit 
knowledge, such as the cognitive and technical 
dimensions [5], we adopt Janik’s second perspective as 
our working definition. In our case, tacit knowledge is 
knowledge that stakeholders know and could have 
articulated but have not for some reason, perhaps because 
they simply were not asked. The portion of tacit 
knowledge that we are focusing on resides between the 
completely tacit level and the explicit level; in other 
words, the codifiable and manageable part of tacit 
knowledge. 
 
In requirement engineering, when key pieces of tacit 
knowledge are not apparent in requirements documents, it 
can make communication difficult. This can be 
particularly problematic when software engineers focus 
on the development of software, while important details 
and assumptions in other stakeholders’ domains are 
overlooked.  
 
3. Presupposition 
One way of determining that tacit knowledge is present 
is by looking at mechanisms in text for making oblique 
references to bits of knowledge that are taken for granted. 
One such mechanism is presupposition. In this section, 
we introduce the notion of presupposition and its 
potential impacts on communication. Before we describe 
presupposition, let us first introduce the notion of 
“context” that we use in this article. Bunt [6] classifies 
different types of context into five general categories: the 
linguistic context, the semantic context, the physical 
context, the social context and the cognitive context. In 
this paper, for presupposition, we employ two of them: 
the linguistic context which consists of the preceding 
sentences in a discourse, and cognitive context including 
beliefs, speakers’ attitudes and world knowledge.  
 
Presupposition is a linguistic phenomenon that 
dominates the largest portion of literature in linguistic 
pragmatics [7]. It has been a central topic in both 
semantics and pragmatics, since Frege was first dealing 
with such problems. When someone produces an 
utterance 1  - for example, an assertion, question or 
command - there can be accompanying assumptions that 
the speaker or author presupposes, that is, which are 
taken for granted. The following are classical and 
representative examples of assertions studied by 
presupposition theorists: 
 
(1) a. The King of France is bald. 
  b. Richard managed to pass the exam. 
  c. Mark has stopped beating his wife. 
 
When a speaker utters these sentences, he/she naturally 
presupposes that there is a King of France, Richard tried 
to pass the exam and Mark used to beat his wife 
respectively2. 
 
The study of presupposition is in fact the study of not 
only natural language but also the interaction between 
people. In other words, speakers rather than statements 
presuppose [9, 10]. In particular, Stalnaker [9] defines the 
notion of pragmatic presupposition as follows: “A 
speaker presupposes that P at a given moment in a 
conversation just in case he is disposed to act, in his 
linguistic behaviour, as if he takes the truth of P for 
granted, and as if he assumes that his audience recognizes 
that he is doing so.” In his definition, it is the speaker 
who presupposes something; the sentence itself is just a 
means of implicitly expressing the speaker’s 
presupposition.  
 
There appear to be two major problems3 in the study of 
                                                 
                                                                              1 An utterance is the form of realizing language in one’s 
individual concrete way [8]. Here we simply use this notion 
to represent a unit of speech or text under study.  
2 There are other presuppositions in these sentences, but the 
focus here is on different types of presupposition. 
3 In fact, there is a third major problem, called presupposition 
failure [14], which is how to judge the truth value of an 
presupposition: presupposition projection and 
presupposition accommodation. An elementary 
presupposition is a presupposition of part of an utterance. 
Presupposition projection, as the name suggests, is the 
study of whether an elementary presupposition is a 
presupposition of the whole utterance. Here two 
examples are given for distinct scenarios in requirements, 
one where an elementary presupposition projects out and 
one where it does not:  
 
(2) a. If funds are inadequate, the system will notify…. 
   b. If there is a system, the system will notify… 
 
Intuitively, when a hearer accepts utterance (2b), he/she 
does not take the presupposition that there is a system for 
granted. The elementary presupposition that there is a 
system in the consequent of the conditional somehow 
does not project. The same elementary presupposition 
that there is a system nevertheless projects out in example 
(2a), which signals to the hearer that the speaker takes for 
granted that there is a system. These examples show that 
presuppositions sometimes do and sometimes do not 
project out. The projection problem is the problem of 
providing a systematic account of when presuppositions 
do and when they do not project out. The tendency of 
presuppositions to project out when embedded in a 
complex sentence is a distinctive property of 
presuppositions. Although other linguistic phenomena 
may sometimes project out as well, - for example 
conversational implicature - presupposition is the only 
one that normally tends to project when embedded in 
various complex sentences containing negation, modal 
operators, etc. [10, 11]. This property has proved to be a 
useful tool for testing whether certain types of syntactic 
structure generate presuppositions, that is, are 
presupposition triggers. These types of syntactic structure 
include, for example, the definite description “the King of 
France” in example (1a) and the implicative verb 
“manage” in example (1b). 
 
 Van der Sandt’s Binding Theory [12] provides an 
effective, though not perfect 4 , explanation of the 
projection problem. Binding Theory makes use of 
discourse representation theory [13] and treats, 
presuppositions as anaphora (an expression, such as a 
pronoun, which depends for its interpretation on a 
preceding expression, i.e., an antecedent). Presupposition 
 
utterance when a presupposition of the utterance is false. 
This is still debated and beyond the scope of this paper. 
4 According to Spenader’s [15] corpus study, the Binding 
Theory lacks an explanation to presuppositions triggered by 
the particle ‘too’. And it also lacks the consideration of 
world knowledge [17]. 
projection is treated as looking for a path to an earlier part 
of the discourse which hosts an antecedent that can bind 
the presupposition5. Whenever an antecedent is found in 
the discourse, the presupposition is bound, and thus does 
not project out. For the presupposition that there is a 
system, the presupposition triggered by “the system” in 
example (2b), an antecedent is found in the clause “If 
there is a system”. However, for example (2a), no 
antecedent can be found in either the sentence or the 
linguistic context (which we assume to be empty). This 
brings us to the second problem of presupposition – 
presupposition accommodation.  
 
According to the Binding Theory, accommodation 
makes presupposition triggers slightly different and more 
powerful in expression than pronominal anaphora. For a 
single pronoun such as “he”, if there is no antecedent 
explicitly provided in the discourse, it cannot be resolved. 
Unlike pronouns, a presupposition has its own descriptive 
content, so that it has the ability to let a hearer 
spontaneously generate an antecedent to be 
accommodated into the cognitive context in order for an 
unbound presupposition to be bound with. For example, 
in this requirement [16]: 
 
(3) The ROW chief initiates the database record. 
 
The presupposition that there is a database record 
triggered by the definite description “the database record” 
cannot be bound with any explicit antecedent. The hearer 
has to mentally construct “a database record” in his 
individual cognitive context to enable the binding process 
for following the discourse. However, we note that if 
there is a relevant antecedent existing in the hearer’s 
cognitive context, the hearer may wrongly choose to bind 
rather than to accommodate. More precisely, the reader of 
this requirement may know a database record A and 
choose to believe A is the record that the document author 
is writing about. However, the document author may 
mean database record B or just a new database record. 
Without further communication, they can arrive at 
different interpretations, each believing they are agreed 
on a same database record. 
 
  According to Stalnaker’s pragmatic definition of 
presupposition, presupposition can point to underlying 
information that is taken for granted and hence is tacit. 
Taking examples from a requirements document [16], 
with the linguistic context set empty, which means these 
sentences appear at the beginning of the document:  
 
                                                 
5 This is analogous to the notion of “anaphora resolution” in 
linguistics [12]. 
(4) a. The RPC readout shall be sent to the terminal. 
   b. Accessibility in the experimental hall is required 
for changing the piggy board where the device 
will be mounted. 
 
In example (4a) the document writer presupposes that 
there is an RPC readout and that there is a terminal. The 
absence of either “an RPC” or “a terminal” is likely to 
cause readers to arrive at different interpretations. In 
addition, if the acronym, RPC, as a regular shorthand 
expression used daily by engineers, is not defined in the 
document explicitly, there could be difficulties in 
understanding for readers. Moreover, as Piwek & 
Krahmer [17] point out, world knowledge is often 
essential for resolving presuppositions. In example (4b), 
the document reader must have the knowledge that the 
piggy board is a kind of device in order to understand this 
requirement correctly. Different intentions - examples (3) 
and (4a) - and different world knowledge - example (4b) - 
between stakeholders and the document writer may 
possibly lead to different interpretations of a piece of 
presupposed information without being noticed. 
Therefore, we propose that a large amount of tacit 
knowledge can be extracted by detecting and analyzing 
presuppositions existing in requirements, and that 
highlighting presuppositions may allow us to mitigate the 
negative effects of tacit knowledge.  
 
4. Presuppositions in Requirements 
In computational linguistics, presupposition is believed 
to be signalled by certain types of syntactical structure. 
These are called presupposition triggers [7]. In our 
preliminary work so far, we examined one 20-page 
requirements document [16] to determine the presence or 
absence of each kind of presupposition trigger. The 
trigger types we used to identify presuppositions in this 
document were collected from a list of some well-known 
and representative presupposition triggers [7]. Table 1 
shows the result of the study of this document and the 
trigger types used.  
 
In this document, presuppositions triggered by definite 
descriptions appeared 399 times. This highlights the 
volume of presupposed information in requirements 
documents. We expected to find examples of all the 
trigger types in the list we used. However, apart from 
definite descriptions, some of the trigger types were 
absent or few in this document. The absent trigger types 
include: change of stage verb (e.g. continue, stop), cleft 
(It + be + noun + subordinate clause), stressed 
constituents (words in italic in texts) and counterfactual 
conditionals (what would be the case if something were 
true). As a preliminary validation of this distribution of 
presuppositions, another requirements document was 
checked, which suggests that the results are consistent. 
  
Some example sentences (S) are taken from the 
document coupled with their presuppositions (P) 
including (trigger in bald): 
 
(5) S: …tests revealed that redundancy to Single Event 
Upsets is required. (factive verb) 
   P: redundancy to Single Event Upsets is required. 
   S: …chambers shall avoid that two CMA share the 
same gas volume…(implicative verb) 
   P: two CMA may share the same gas volume. 
 
 
Trigger 
Types 
Examples of 
Triggers from the 
Document 
Number of 
Occurrence
s 
Definite 
Description 
“the terminal” 399 
Factive verb “reveal” 1 
Implicative 
verb 
“avoid” 3 
Expression of 
repetition 
“also” 1 
 Temporal 
relation 
“since”, “after” 2 
Comparison “less/larger than” 3 
Question questions presenting 
alternatives 
1 
Table 1. Different types of triggered presuppositions, 
in the requirements document 
 
We used the Stanford Lexicalized Parser [18] to help 
track definite descriptions. The documents were parsed 
into grammatical parse trees, so that definite descriptions 
starting with determiners like “the”, “that” and “his” etc. 
could easily be found automatically. Unfortunately, most 
other kinds of presupposition triggers can only be 
discovered by hand at the moment, because there is no 
full vocabulary of presupposition triggers. Currently, we 
have defined the categories in terms of a few 
representative example words or constructions. In our 
future work, for these undocumented trigger types, we 
will be looking for an automated way to detect them 
based on natural language processing techniques.  
 
One example that is of particular interest is mentioned 
in section 3. It concerns an acronym, “the RPC”, which is 
not defined within the document. The existence of an 
RPC is, however, presupposed as a result of the presence 
of the definite noun phrase “the RPC”; in other words, 
“the RPC” is a presupposition trigger. For a reader, an 
undefined acronym is to some extent similar to an 
unknown noun. There is, however, more scope for 
misunderstandings or confusion when an undefined 
acronym is involved. Whereas noun meanings are usually 
closed - there is typically only one or very few 
interpretations - acronyms often have many different 
meanings. Consequently, there is a higher risk that the 
reader will pick out an unintended meaning. For example, 
the acronym ATM has at least 25 meanings according to 
Wikipedia [19] from domains including science, 
technology, organizations and health. Within the 
technology domain, there are definitions such as: 
Automated Teller Machine, Asynchronous Transfer 
Mode, Alternating Turing Machine, Apollo Telescope 
Mount and Adobe Type Manager. We tested our 
hypothesis regarding the difference between unknown 
nouns and undefined acronyms informally by asking 
three persons with no technological domain knowledge to 
read the following sentences: 
 
(5)  a. The peptide bond has two resonance forms 
      b. The ATM was one of a number of projects that 
came out of the late 1960's. 
 
For the first sentence (5a), two of the participants were 
curious about the meaning of “peptide bond”. But for the 
second sentence (5b), all of respondents took the 
definition of ATM that they know the best for granted, 
which is Automated Teller Machine. The sentence was, 
however, extracted from a Wikipedia article [20] 
describing the Apollo Telescope Mount. This suggests, 
unsurprisingly, that there are circumstances in which 
undefined acronyms can lead to misinterpretation by 
some readers. What this also suggests is that when we 
consider presuppositions as a cause for 
misunderstandings and confusion, we should examine not 
just the interpretation of the presupposition trigger as a 
whole, but also its component parts. 
 
5. Future work 
  We plan to focus on developing an automatic approach 
for tracing presupposition triggers so as to reveal tacit 
knowledge in requirements. So far, we have collected 
some elementary presuppositions in requirements 
documents. After finding a way of tracing presupposition 
triggers, we need to investigate building binding relations 
between those elementary presuppositions. With a 
collection of presuppositions in requirements and an 
automatic tool, software engineers and domain experts 
can be asked to judge if each type of triggered 
presupposition that contains tacit knowledge impacts 
negatively on the quality of requirements documents.  
 
In the MaTREx6 project, we will use presupposition 
analysis with ambiguity analysis in requirements 
documents to detect the possible existence of tacit 
knowledge. These two kinds of analysis, both of which 
have to do with management of requirements 
information, are related to each other, since ambiguously 
presupposed information could result in misinterpreted 
assumptions. According to the Binding Theory, when no 
specific binding can be established because a number of 
candidates are equally plausible, the text remains 
uninterpreted. For instance: 
  
(6) a. A communication requirement and a performance 
requirement will be discussed in this document. 
  b. The requirement is difficult to express. 
 
In this example it is unclear whether “the requirement” 
refers to the communication or the performance 
requirement. Subsequently, more documents will be 
analyzed and presuppositions will be collected to observe 
their behaviour and linguistic attributes for building a 
system. With the help of natural language processing 
techniques, our aim for this system is to help both readers 
and writers track presuppositions so as to mitigate the 
negative effects of tacit knowledge.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Our preliminary work has shown that various 
presuppositions exist in requirements documents and 
some may be unclear to readers. We highlighted several 
cases and one of which involved undefined acronyms. 
Future work will focus on effective ways of automatically 
finding presuppositions in requirements, and the potential 
existence of tacit knowledge behind them. In particular, 
we aim to build a system that can automatically highlight 
presuppositions which have a negative impact on 
communication in requirements documents.  
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